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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded her most recent visit to the Wil-
liam S. Richardson School of Law on Lincoln’s Birthday, 2017.1 During her 
visit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its unanimous decision 
upholding the initial order that enjoined the Trump Administration’s initial 
travel ban,2 and I had the great pleasure of informing Justice Ginsburg of that 
significant judicial action—and of being present as she immediately imbibed 
the opinion in a way that gave new meaning to “being focused.” 
Justice Ginsburg’s presence, her words to high school students as well as 
law students and members of the larger community, coupled with the dramatic 
Ninth Circuit decision that paid attention to the rule of law, prompted some ini-
tial thoughts about a possible way to follow Justice Ginsburg’s own example of 
effective, creative use of existing legal materials to advance the search for jus-
tice in the face of the new Trump Terror. 
The Trump Administration’s enthusiastic targeting of undocumented resi-
dents of the United States directly aids employers across the United States by 
supplying a realistic scare tactic (or worse) that they can use against their 
                                                        
*  Dean and Professor, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai’i. I 
would like to thank the staff of the Nevada Law Journal for being exceptionally pleasant and 
helpful. Professor Ruben Garcia deserves special mention for his customary graciousness 
and great skill in organizing this entire Symposium, and my fellow participants also have 
earned my great respect and gratitude. My greatest debt is to Taylor Brack, William S. Rich-
ardson School of Law ’19, who is among a handful of the very best research assistants I have 
ever had in over 40 years of publishing law review articles. 
1  See generally Kelli Trifonovitch, Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Shares Decades of Wisdom with UH Law Students, U. HAW. NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017), https://ww 
w.hawaii.edu/news/2017/02/09/supreme-court-associate-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-shares-
decades-of-wisdom-with-uh-law-students/ [https://perma.cc/3DEN-FX5N]. 
2  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), reh’g en banc 
denied, 858 F.3d 1168, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court reversed a subsequent 
Ninth Circuit decision that had upheld a nationwide injunction against the third Trump travel 
ban in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
19 NEV. L.J. 397, SOIFER 4/8/2019  5:17 PM 
398 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
 
workers. In the shadowy gloom of possible deportation, employers can now 
even more effectively exploit those workers who lack “proper papers.” 
My suggestion is that this harsh reality might be at least slowed through a 
lawsuit or lawsuits aimed directly at employers who, with the help of federal 
agents, are now further emboldened to squeeze undocumented workers even 
harder. And there is a virtually unknown 1867 federal statute that speaks direct-
ly to this harsh reality—the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, now codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). The original context as well as the current statutory lan-
guage might well be useful in litigating against the personal devastation 
wrought by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Trump Admin-
istration, and the “outsourcing of American Democracy.”3 
Much as the 1960s led creative lawyers to rediscover and invoke civil 
rights statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and to do so with notewor-
thy success, our perilous times now call for attention to the Peonage Abolition 
Act, passed by the same 39th Congress and based on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, thus not requiring “state action.” As Attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
her colleagues poured new meaning into the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Peonage Abolition Act similarly offers relevant 
textual support along with the bonus of clear and supportive legislative intent.4 
Currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1994, the statute states in its entirety: 
The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peon-
age is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United 
States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Terri-
tory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by 
virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or en-
force, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any 
persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are de-
clared null and void.5 
Attention to the origins of this statute enhances the possibilities to invoke it 
on behalf of noncitizens. In fact, the 39th Congress specifically focused on the 
exploitation of Mexicans and Indians, undeniably noncitizens, in the territory of 
New Mexico in 1866—exploitation in which members of the US Army actively 
                                                        
3  See generally JODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009). See also CAM SIMPSON, THE GIRL FROM 
KATHMANDU (2018) for a discussion of the twelve Nepalese laborers killed by terrorists 
while working in Iraq through a contract between United States military and KBR Hallibur-
ton. 
4  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 239–40 (1867). Senator Charles Sumner stressed a 
report that US Army personnel had been aiding in the capture of Mexicans and Indians so 
that they would be made peons as he introduced the bill that became the Peonage Abolition 
Act on the first day of the lame-duck 39th Congress. 
5  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) (emphasis added). The current version is virtually unchanged 
from what the 39th Congress adopted, with the exception of omitting the specific reference 
to the Territory of New Mexico and replacing it with “Territory or State.” 
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collaborated.6 The protection the act sought to provide was not, and still is not, 
limited to citizens. It extends to “any person” held to “service or labor [in a] 
system known as peonage” by means “directly or indirectly.”7 And though the 
statute has been virtually ignored, its definition of peonage is sweeping: the 
statute bans “the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as pe-
ons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise.”8 
As the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had long been relegated to history’s dust-
bin until it was resuscitated in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., attention could 
and should be paid to the specific provisions of an important 150-year-old stat-
ute.9 In many ways parallel to the 1866 Civil Rights Act,10 an only slightly old-
er sibling to the Peonage Abolition Act, the 39th Congress added broad protec-
tions even for noncitizens who were being exploited through benighted public-
private partnerships within the jurisdiction of the United States.11 Though ini-
tially it may seem far-fetched to invoke an almost unknown statute, the old 
promise of enacting into law “a new birth of freedom” in the wake of the Civil 
War could be central to the current and ongoing civil rights struggles.12 Before 
turning to several ways in which the Peonage Abolition Act is strikingly rele-
vant to the current crisis for undocumented workers, as well as the plight of 
foreign workers exploited through the iron triangle of public-private partner-
ships involving the US military-industrial complex and American contract law, 
a brief summary of its historical context may be useful. 
                                                        
6  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 239–40 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Sumner); see also 
Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition of 
Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1614–18 (2012) [hereinafter Soifer, Federal 
Protection and Paternalism]. 
7  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). 
8  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (emphasis added). There was not yet a Fourteenth Amendment, and thus 
Congress relied on its new authority under the Thirteenth Amendment. Strikingly, Congress 
used the Thirteenth Amendment’s section 2 enforcement clause to extend rights beyond the 
reach of the language of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished only slavery and in-
voluntary servitude, and did not extend to the knotty issue of “voluntary servitude.” 
9  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421–22 (1968). 
10  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981–1982). For discussion of the Civil Rights Act, see infra note 15. 
11  See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948); Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican 
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L. REV. 662, 
670 (1975) (“But section 1981, because of its foundation in the fourteenth amendment, has 
long been interpreted as banning state action which discriminates on the basis of alienage.”); 
id. at 664 (“In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, however, the Court concluded that the 
thirteenth amendment, in outlawing the institution of slavery, also empowered Congress to 
ban both public and private racial or color discrimination as vestiges of slavery not immedi-
ately eradicated by the prohibition of the institution itself . . . . As a result of the Court’s re-
assessment of the thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act, sections 1981 and 1982 
have become important vehicles for combatting private discrimination . . .”). 
12  President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863); see also CHARLES L. 
BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM (1997). 
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I. THE 39TH CONGRESS 
The central purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to eliminate the 
ongoing vestiges of slavery and to protect all those whom the act made citi-
zens.13 In overriding President Johnson’s veto—the first time a presidential ve-
to was overridden on a major piece of legislation in the nation’s history—the 
members of the 39th Congress found it necessary to respond to the Black 
Codes newly adopted throughout the South as well as to try to prevent more of 
the vicious violence that recently-freed slaves regularly encountered.14 Presi-
dent Johnson exacerbated the situation repeatedly with his outrageous, belliger-
ent statements as well as his efforts to readmit the southern states without ex-
tracting any meaningful conditions.15 
Johnson further blundered as he tried, but miserably failed, to launch a new 
national political party in the summer of 1866.16 Senator James R. Doolittle (R-
WI), who had chaired Johnson’s failed National Union Convention, stated that 
Johnson’s subsequent disastrous “Swing Round the Circle” attempt to take his 
Reconstruction policies to the people had probably cost Johnson and his allies 
one million votes.17 
Against this backdrop, and with considerable enthusiasm among the voters 
for the 39th Congress’s newly proposed Fourteenth Amendment, many Moder-
                                                        
13  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) 
(“[T]he very object of the bill is to break down all discrimination between black men and 
white men[.] . . . [It] is simply intended to carry out a constitutional provision, and guaranty 
to every person of every color the same civil rights.”). 
14  See id. at 474 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull) (“Since the abolition of slavery, the Legisla-
tures which have assembled in the insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the 
freedmen, and in nearly all the States they have discriminated against them. They deny them 
certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very re-
strictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery, and 
before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all these 
discriminations, and to carry into effect the constitutional amendment.”); id. at 1293–94 (re-
marks of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 1118 (remarks of Rep. Wilson). 
15  President Johnson claimed that the Civil Rights Bill “ ‘frustrate[d]’ the inevitable ‘adjust-
ment’ by former slaves and former masters to a new economic model. If only ‘left to the 
laws that regulate capital and labor,’ a ‘harmonious’ new equilibrium would arise between 
the two.” Darrell A.H. Miller, A Thirteenth Amendment Agenda for the Twenty-first Century: 
Of Promises, Power, and Precaution, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND 
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 293 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 
2010) (alteration in original); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988). Indeed, President Johnson’s veto message spe-
cifically rejected the Civil Rights Act of 1866 because in it: “a perfect equality of the white 
and black races is attempted to be fixed by Federal law, in every state of the Union, over the 
vast field of State jurisdiction covered by these enumerate rights.” Miller supra at 204. 
Aviam Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights: The Floor and More, in THE PROMISES OF 
LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
204 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) [hereafter Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights]. 
16  See DAVID O. STEWART, IMPEACHED: THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE 
FIGHT FOR LINCOLN’S LEGACY 59–73 (2009). 
17  See Soifer, Federal Protection and Paternalism, supra note 6, at 1615–19. 
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ate Republicans found themselves driven into the arms of the Radical Republi-
cans. The Republican Party won a smashing congressional victory in Novem-
ber 1866 and the 40th Congress promised to be considerably more Radical (and 
what we might term “veto-proof”) than the 39th had been.18 The current neces-
sity for swift and dramatic responses to the outrages being perpetrated almost 
daily echoes the Northern political mood of late 1866 and early 1867. 
On January 3, 1867, the day that the lame duck session of 39th Congress 
officially convened, Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA) rose to make a troubling 
report.19 Sumner, the Radical Republican leader and a hero within the antislav-
ery movement,20 informed his colleagues of the scandalous fact that—despite 
an executive proclamation and supporting orders from the War Department—
federal troops were aiding in a system of peonage in the Territory of New Mex-
ico.21 
Sumner’s comments were based directly upon the 1866 Report of the 
Commissioner on Indian Affairs as well as a report made by Special Agent J.K. 
Graves to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.22 Both reports sought swift con-
gressional action to end the alarming situation in New Mexico.23 Special Agent 
Graves warned that such an important change would not be easy because peo-
ple in the Territory of New Mexico had been living under this detestable “sys-
tem of labor for centuries” and thus probably would “cling tenaciously to their 
                                                        
18  See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11–18 (1995); STEWART, supra note 16, at 73. 
19  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 239–40 (1867). 
20  See generally DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 
(1970); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 
(Sourcebooks, Inc. 2009) (1960). Sumner’s fame primarily rested on his fervent antislavery 
views and speeches and his leadership in the Senate, but his reputation was enhanced when 
he barely survived being caned in 1856 by South Carolina Representative Preston (“Bully”) 
Brooks while Sumner sat pinned by his desk on the Senate floor. Id. at 242–46. 
21  Senator Sumner proclaimed: 
I think you will be astonished when you know that the evidence is complete that at this moment 
in a Territory of the United States there is a system of slavery which a proclamation of the Presi-
dent has down to this day been unable to root out. During the life of [President] Lincoln I more 
than once appealed to him to exercise his power as the head of the executive, to root this evil out 
of the Territory of New Mexico. The result was a proclamation and also definite orders from the 
Department of War; but in the face of that proclamation and of those definite orders this abuse 
has continued, and according to the official evidence it seems to have increased. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1867). 
22  See id. 
23  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER 
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1866), http://images.library.wisc.edu/History/EFacs/CommRep/AnnRep 
66/reference/history.annrep66.i0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBR4-VMXV] (last visited Dec. 
9, 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT OF SPECIAL 
AGENT J.K. GRAVES, No. 40 133–34 (1866), http://images.library.wisc.edu/History/EFacs/Co 
mmRep/AnnRep66/reference/history.annrep66.i0011.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYY8-849W] 
(last visited Dec. 9, 2018) [hereinafter REPORT OF SPECIAL AGENT J.K. GRAVES]. 
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old customs.”24 Graves asserted that nothing short of vigorous governmental 
intervention could change the existing system.25 
Slavery and peonage in the American Southwest did not exactly mirror the 
enslavement of African Americans in the South yet conflicts among Native 
American tribes and between those tribes and the Mexican settlers were a fact 
of life in the region.26 Captives from both sides, mostly women and children, 
were placed in, or returned to, peonage through the direct assistance of mem-
bers of the United States Army.27 
Ironically, it is only recently that the complexity of the enslavement of In-
dians in Mexico and across the southwestern United States has been studied 
systematically. The work of Andrés Reséndez, for example, stands out for 
Reséndez’s mastery of fine detail in his study of the Texas and New Mexico 
frontier and in his sweeping description of the myriad of forms that constituted 
Native American enslavement.28 
The enslavement of indigenous people had persisted in the Americas for 
centuries before 1866—initially by the Native Americans themselves—yet 
“with the arrival of Europeans, practices of captivity originally embedded in 
specific cultural contexts became commodified, expanded in unexpected ways, 
                                                        
24  REPORT OF SPECIAL AGENT J.K. GRAVES, supra note 23, at 133–34. 
25  See id. at 133. 
26  See JAMES F. BROOKS, CAPTIVES AND COUSINS: SLAVERY, KINSHIP, AND COMMUNITY IN 
THE SOUTHWEST BORDERLANDS 33 (2002) (“To explore this region’s slave economy is to 
complicate and enrich our understanding of North American slavery. Indigenous peoples like 
Apaches, Comanches, Utes, Navajos, Pawnees, and Pueblos (to name but a few) had prac-
ticed the capture, adoption, intermarriage, and occasional sacrifice of outsiders since well 
before European entry into the region . . . . [T]he Spanish colonists who came to northern 
New Spain (later Mexico) in the sixteenth century also carried with them customs of capture, 
enslavement, adoption, and exploitation of non-Christian peoples, dating from the Iberian 
reconquista, when the Muslim-Christian borderlands formed a field of violence and intercul-
tural negotiation within which a volatile coexistence prevailed across several centuries.”). 
27  See id. at 30, 34 (“Native American and Spanish colonial men found that the survival of 
their communities depended, in part, on their ability to exchange both human and material 
resources across cultural boundaries. Often undertaken in acts of violence, these exchanges 
also produced unexpected, often fortuitous results because the women and children who 
crossed cultures proved remarkably adept at making something of their unfortunate circum-
stances. The combined product of these structural imperatives and the creative potential of 
human action emerged as a system of slavery unique to the Southwest Borderlands but with 
strong similarities to other regions where colonial and indigenous people met in relative pari-
ty. . . . Here, beneath the profound cultural differences and steady conflicts punctuating Indi-
an and Spanish colonial relations, native and Spanish men shared similar notions of honor, 
shame, and gender, with the control of women and children as a central proof of status. Both 
branches of borderland slavery could interact because they grew from shared patriarchal 
structures of power and patrimony that contrast sharply with the racial divisiveness and labor 
exploitation around which the more familiar forms of Euramerican enslavement of Africans 
functioned.”). See also ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY: THE UNDISCOVERED STORY 
OF INDIAN ENSLAVEMENT IN AMERICA 8–9 (2016) (regarding the surge in Indian enslavement 
during the Civil War in the West as culminating in the Navajo campaign of 1863-1864). 
28  See generally ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, CHANGING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AT THE FRONTIER 
(2005); RESÉNDEZ, supra note 27. 
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and came to resemble the kinds of human trafficking that are recognizable to us 
today.”29 The practice evolved and took on many different names and descrip-
tions that encompassed a “range of forms of captivity and coercion.”30 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Senator Sumner and his colleagues 
sought to end the involvement of Americans in the practice of unfree labor 
once and for all.31 
The fact that the 39th Congress took seriously the “protection” part of 
“equal protection” is largely overlooked. But, it is important to note that Con-
gress first articulated the idea at length within the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s 
guarantee of “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings.”32 As Con-
gress considered a nation very badly in need of reconstruction, the men of the 
39th Congress echoed Chief Justice John Marshall’s pronouncement for the 
unanimous Court in Marbury v. Madison: “The very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is 
to afford that protection.”33 These words, and the attitude that informed them, 
clearly influenced the writing and passage of the Peonage Abolition Act. 
On March 2, 1867, Congress easily adopted the Peonage Abolition Act that 
Sumner had proposed—the same day that Congress divided the South into five 
sections and sent in the US Army.34 As the texts of both the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments make clear, those who passed and sought to imple-
ment this Second Constitution in the wake of the Civil War certainly did not 
embrace state sovereignty. Nonetheless, belief in an unwritten states’ rights 
version of the Constitution remains a hardy perennial. Chief Justice Roberts re-
cently provided a disturbing example of its mystical power. 
To be sure, there are substantial holes in Roberts’s majority opinion in 
Shelby County v. Holder,35 due to its illogic, abuse of precedent, and blatant 
lack of respect for a co-equal branch36 Yet Roberts also relies upon a remarka-
ble revision of the text of the Tenth Amendment. That amendment states: “The 
                                                        
29  RESÉNDEZ, supra note 27, at 3. 
30  Id. at 10. 
31  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Conness in re-
sponse to the 1866 Report of Special Agent J.K. Graves) (“It is also known to me, as it has 
been for perhaps four years past, that the administration of military affairs in the Territory of 
New Mexico has been a standing disgrace to this Government . . . . I have failed utterly in all 
the attempts I have been able to make in getting such attention to the subject as would lead to 
a correction. I hope that this inquiry will go in that direction and finally be effective.”). 
32  Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights, supra note 15, at 197. 
33  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
34  Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (outlawing peonage); An Act to 
Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States (Military Reconstruction 
Act), ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (dividing the southern states). 
35  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
36  For my own brief critique of Shelby County, see Aviam Soifer, Of Swords, Shields, and a 
Gun to the Head: Coercing Individuals, But Not States, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 787, 796-98 
(2016) [hereinafter Soifer, Of Swords, Shields, and a Gun to the Head]. 
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powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”37 The 
Chief Justice paraphrased the Tenth Amendment much differently. Roberts 
wrote, “Indeed, the Constitution provides that all powers not specifically grant-
ed to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or citizens. Amdt. 
10.”38  
His insertion of the word “specifically” is particularly striking because, 
when the First Congress proposed this amendment, James Madison led a suc-
cessful fight against including the word “expressly” precisely at the point 
where Roberts inserted “specifically.”39 Madison successfully argued that this 
limitation in the Articles of Confederation undermined its effectiveness. Rob-
erts added a second major alteration as he transformed the amendment’s re-
served power “to the people” into power reserved only for “citizens.” The Pe-
onage Abolition Act’s broad protection for noncitizens specifically illustrates 
the 39th Congress’s commitment to protect all “persons” within the jurisdiction 
of the United States.  
The same 39th Congress, which earlier promulgated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, similarly included broad protection of the rights of persons—as 
distinguished from the rights of citizens—in several important places in its text. 
Though Chief Justice Roberts may have been only paraphrasing, his apparently 
willful inaccuracies are misleading at best, and constitute an alarmingly clear 
departure from the “originalism” and “textualism” celebrated by members of 
the Shelby County majority. 
A sense of an overarching and vital obligation to afford protection even to 
noncitizens—explicitly extending even to those whose citizenship and loyalty 
lay elsewhere—helps to explain the Court’s somewhat cryptic decision in Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, in which Justice Matthews held for a unanimous Court that 
even a Chinese alien who still owed loyalty to the Emperor had United States 
constitutional rights deserving of protection.40 The Court noted that the Consti-
tution protected Yick Wo against a law that, although “fair on its face,” was 
“applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal 
hand.”41 Less well known is the Court’s pronouncement of a “universal” prom-
ise “to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any dif-
                                                        
37  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
38  Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 543. 
39  Soifer, Of Swords, Shields, and a Gun to the Head, supra note 36, at 797. 
40  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367 (1886) (quoting Barbier v. Connolly for the key 
point that the Fourteenth Amendment was “undoubtedly intended, not only that there should 
be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal 
protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of 
their personal and civil rights.” 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884)). 
41  Id. at 374. 
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ferences of race, of color, or of nationality;” this promise specifically included 
the “pledge of the protection of equal laws.”42 
Nonetheless, victims of labor exploitation within the United States did not 
long enjoy the broad coverage of the Peonage Abolition Act. The pinched defi-
nitions of peonage adopted by many judges, including the Justices of the US 
Supreme Court, frustrated victims’ attempts to seek legal remedies for the 
abuse they suffered under their employers.43 These later, extremely narrow def-
initions of peonage in criminal law proclaimed that debt was a necessary ele-
ment44 and that physical coercion was a necessary condition.45 
Even in recent times in United States v. Shackney, for example, the distin-
guished Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Henry J. Friendly held that 
federal criminal law could not reach the plight of a Mexican worker on a chick-
en farm, though a Rabbi—himself an immigrant—kept the worker from leaving 
the farm or drinking anything alcoholic under a two-year contract by threaten-
ing to have him deported.46 Friendly explained that for as long as the worker 
“still has a choice, however painful,” federal criminal law did not extend to his 
situation.47 Congress finally did extend the protection of federal criminal law 
through the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.48 
                                                        
42  Id. at 369. For an intriguing scholarly debate about the core meaning of Yick Wo, compare 
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1359 with Thomas W. Joo, Yick Wo Re-Visited: Nonblack Nonwhites and Fourteenth 
Amendment History, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1427. 
43  Years ago, I explored these and related decisions construing the Thirteenth Amendment in 
Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United 
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 269 (1987). 
44  See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (rejecting badges and incidents 
of slavery claim for protection from mob because Thirteenth Amendment “not an attempt to 
commit [blacks] to the care of the nation.”); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 
(1905) (debt was the necessary “basal” condition for peonage). But see United States v. 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914) (invalidating Alabama’s convict leasing alternative 
to the chain gang); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (invalidating conviction for 
fraud as basis for Alabama sharecropping system). The Court finally spoke boldly against 
peonage in Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944). On the basis of the Peonage Abolition 
Act, Justice Jackson’s majority opinion struck down the vicious Florida sharecropping sys-
tem. Jackson noted that in passing the statute in 1867, “Congress thus raised both a shield 
and a sword against forced labor because of debt.” Id. at 8. See generally James Gray Pope, 
Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servi-
tude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474 (2010). 
45  See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934, 953 (1988) (even psychological coer-
cion of two mentally challenged farm workers on a dairy farm, kept “in poor health, in squal-
id conditions, and in relative isolation” for well over a decade, insufficient to sustain a crim-
inal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 and 18 U.S.C. § 241). 
46  United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 476–77 (2d Cir. 1964). 
47  Id. at 487. 
48  Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). See generally Rebecca E. 
Zeitlow, The Promise of Congressional Enforcement, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE 
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 182, 190–91 
(Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010). It nonetheless frequently still has proven difficult to convict 
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In contrast to the jagged history of attempts to use the criminal law against 
the coercion of workers, the language of the Peonage Abolition Act offers vir-
tually untapped potential for civil law. Its historical context underscores how 
broadly the veteran members of the 39th Congress—the authors of the Four-
teenth Amendment—viewed their constitutional authority and their commit-
ment to assist former slaves, to protect the vulnerable, and to forbid peonage of 
any kind, premised on the need to give specific meaning to the Thirteenth 
Amendment.49 
And it certainly does not require a “latitudinarian”50 construction to grasp 
the statute’s breadth; the protection it provides explicitly was not limited to cit-
izens in any way. In fact, it specifically extends to “any person” held to “ser-
vice or labor in a system known as peonage” by means “directly or indirectly” 
anywhere in the United States or its territories.51 It prohibited “all acts, laws, 
resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages” anywhere within the jurisdiction of 
the United States that put or kept anyone in peonage in the past, present, or fu-
ture.52 In addition, the statute’s definition of peonage is strikingly broad: it bans 
“the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liqui-
                                                                                                                                
those who are exploiting workers through psychological coercion, confiscation of passports, 
and similar coercive measures. 
49  Their emphasis on providing protection permeates the debates over the Freedman’s Bu-
reau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as the Peonage Abolition Act. This aspect 
of Congress’s reforming zeal to afford needed protection has rarely been acknowledged by 
the US Supreme Court. Even in the period when Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
dominated equal protection analysis, however, the Court did strike down a Louisville, Ken-
tucky ordinance that supported a private restrictive covenant in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 
U.S. 60, 76–77 (1917). Justice Day’s opinion for a unanimous Court quoted Strauder v. West 
Virginia as follows: 
It [the Fourteenth Amendment] was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all 
the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the pro-
tection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the states. 
It not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to 
any state the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws, and authorized Con-
gress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1880)). 
But see, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment was “to pro-
tect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other. 
The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation . . . to the demo-
cratic political processes.”). 
50  “Latitudinarian” referred to a tolerant approach within religious disputation beginning in 
the seventeenth century. By the mid-nineteenth century, the word was often used as a pejora-
tive gibe in congressional debates. The Oxford English Dictionary defines latitudinarian as 
“[a]llowing, favouring, or characterized by latitude in opinion or action, esp. in matters 
of religion; not insisting on strict adherence to or conformity with an established code, 
standard, formula, etc.; tolerating free thought or laxity of belief on religious questions; 
characteristic of the latitudinarians[.]” Latitudinarian, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d 
ed. 1991). 
51  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). 
52  Id. 
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dation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise.”53 It is so sweeping, in fact, that 
its very breadth may explain why it may seem frightening to begin to ask judg-
es to determine what its reach and its limits ought to be. 
The very concept of “voluntary peonage,” for example, may trigger a clash 
among deeply held beliefs. Is every contract at base a form of voluntary peon-
age? Does it make sense that courts over many decades have refused to order 
specific performance by opera singers,54 for example, yet will give very little 
attention to other forms of coercion? Indeed, the concept of coercion may be so 
malleable as to mislead rather than illuminate a great deal of legal analysis.55 
Despite the contradictions within the “freedom to contract” that remains 
part of the foundation of the American labor market, the pervasive and persis-
tent problem of labor exploitation, then and now, demands, not only attention 
to existing broad legal definitions of peonage, but also a willingness on the part 
of victims to pursue justice in a court of law.56 
Despite the potential within both the language and the history of the stat-
ute, it is necessary to recognize and address the desuetude of the Peonage Abo-
lition Act. The following section addresses a few of the practical difficulties as 
well as a few possible avenues for lawyerly originality if this 1867 statute is to 
be revived as a partial response to today’s very troubled times. It is undertaken 
                                                        
53  Id. There was not yet a Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress therefore relied on its new 
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment. There would be, therefore, no need to prove 
state action in a section 1994 action. It is noteworthy that Congress used the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s section 2 enforcement clause to extend rights clearly stretching beyond the 
reach of the language of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished only slavery and in-
voluntary servitude, and did not extend to “voluntary servitude.” This contemporaneous ex-
ample of the 39th Congress’s sense of its own authority through the Thirteenth Amendment 
to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation” strongly suggests parallel broad congres-
sional authority through the Fourteenth Amendment’s section 5: “The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” Despite this unu-
sually compelling historical context, however, the Supreme Court over the past quarter cen-
tury has adopted an extremely parsimonious view of Congress’s enforcement power in the 
name of federalism limits. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) 
(limiting the Voting Rights Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala, v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
374 (2001) (limiting the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (limiting the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (limiting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
54  See Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687 (holding it inappropriate to order 
specific performance by an individual artist). 
55  See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Po-
litical” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 149–50 (1935). An impres-
sive introduction to, and analysis of, Hale’s work may be found in BARBARA H. FRIED, THE 
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE (1998). See also Soifer, Federal Protection and 
Paternalism, supra note 6, at 1630–37; Soifer, Of Swords, Shields, and a Gun to the Head, 
supra note 36, at 808–12. 
56  See RESÉNDEZ, supra note 27, at 8 (“Disguised as debt peonage, which stretched the lim-
its of accepted labor institutions and even posed as legal work, this other slavery was the di-
rect forerunner of the forms of bondage practiced today.”). 
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with considerable humility, however; this brief section reflects tentative ideas 
admittedly launched from the ivory tower by an academic who is anything but 
a litigator. Yet it also may be that even a lawsuit that ultimately does not suc-
ceed may have preemptive value as well as offering a bully pulpit. 
II. PRACTICAL ISSUES 
A. Plaintiffs: 
The most obvious first necessary step is to identify possible plaintiffs. Giv-
en the broad reach and extreme deference accorded to ICE, any potential indi-
vidual plaintiff would quite understandably be fearful about coming forward. 
There is the possibility of anonymity in court filings, of course, and it could 
well be that a suit in federal court might even afford some protection to, for in-
stance, a “Juanita Roe.” Just about any federal judge would be miffed, to say 
the least, to learn of plaintiffs being deported before getting their full day in 
court if they had been accorded standing and were within the judge’s jurisdic-
tion. 
Another possibility would be for a group to seek standing, most probably 
on behalf of particular members. To be sure, there is strength in numbers. In 
addition, some of the groups working on behalf of undocumented people could 
meet the usual requirements for standing, and so might some progressive un-
ions who could credibly claim that the exploitation of those who are vulnerable 
because they are undocumented interferes directly with a union’s organizing 
efforts as well as directly harming the pocketbook interests of its members. 
Finally, undocumented people who are being held in detention and being 
paid a pittance for work they are supposed to do within the detention center 
might make a particularly strong claim to have standing. 
B. Private Cause of Action 
In many decisions since Alexander v. Sandoval,57 lower federal courts have 
followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead in making it increasingly difficult to 
infer private causes of action throughout a large array of federal statutes.58 And 
the Peonage Abolition Act does not specify who may sue and for what remedy. 
                                                        
57  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278–79 (2001) (holding no Title VI private right of 
action to challenge English-only driver’s license test). 
58  See, e.g., Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Mass. Elec. Co., 875 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 
2017) (ruling a claim under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act failed because plain-
tiff did not show that Congress unequivocally conferred a private cause of action); Abrahams 
v. MTA Long Island Bus, 644 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that public participation 
requirement in developing and assessing paratransit services did not establish a private cause 
of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 12143); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 
1091, 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the National Historic Preservation Act’s “look 
and listen” provision akin to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370m, weighed against an implied cause of action). 
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Nonetheless, its companion statutory civil rights statutes have long been held 
correctly to imply private rights of action.59 
This is clearly the case with the language of the Ku Klux Klan Act,60 for 
example, as well as in the ability of individuals to invoke the statutory remnants 
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.61 The constitutional and statutory company sur-
rounding the Peonage Abolition Act make an implied private right of action an-
chored in the Peonage Abolition Act clearly more plausible than not—even ap-
plying the crabbed rubric now used by the Supreme Court in deciding whether 
there is indeed an implied cause of action within federal statutes.62 
The key issue in assessing whether an implied cause of action is available 
to potential federal plaintiffs remains what Congress intended in the specific 
statute at issue. Alexander v. Sandoval led the way toward the Court’s recent 
and increasingly narrow approach.63 Yet the intricacies of that decision’s dis-
tinction between Title IX and Title VII within the Civil Rights Act of 1964—
and their relative weight in construing a federal agency’s regulations—are all 
but irrelevant to the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867.64 
In fact, the 39th Congress could not leave litigation to the Department of 
Justice because there was no Department of Justice until 1870.65 Nor is there 
                                                        
59  See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1999) (upholding 
private cause of action under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 to remedy student-on-
student harassment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (recognizing implied cause of action for Fourth Amendment 
claims against Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 
(1961) (recognizing implied cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Congress 
“meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immuni-
ties by an official’s abuse of his position.”). 
60  An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat 13. (1871) (currently enacted as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)); see The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: 
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032451486 
[https://perma.cc/X9YJ-EP4Q] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018) (stating that the Act of the same 
title is “also known as the ‘Ku Klux Klan Act.’ ”). 
61  42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2012). See generally Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights, 
supra note 15. 
62  See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018). For example, Justice Ken-
nedy’s plurality opinion noted “this Court’s general reluctance to extend judicially created 
private rights of action.” Id. Though Jesner dealt with foreign corporations, Kennedy em-
phasized that: 
[R]ecent precedents cast doubt on the authority of courts to extend or create private causes of ac-
tion even in the realm of domestic law, where this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a 
decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great 
majority of cases. 
Id. 
63  See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
64  Id. at 279–80. 
65  There is a dispute about whether the establishment of the Department of Justice was pri-
marily to enforce rights established during Reconstruction or part of a retrenchment, intend-
ed to save money because payments to private attorneys to do federal work seemed to have 
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any evidence that Congress intended the rights guaranteed in the Peonage Abo-
lition Act to be left only to the mercies of part-time US Attorneys sprinkled 
throughout the country, particularly in the un-Reconstructed South. 
As Justice Scalia explained for the Court in Armstrong v. Exceptional 
Child Center,66 the Supremacy Clause is not the source of any federal rights, 
but “private suits can go forward without statutory authority—if they seek to 
enjoin violations of federal law.”67 That is, unless and until Congress negates 
that authority, which Congress clearly has never done in respect to section 
1994, that authority exists and may be interpreted in light of related statutory 
language. In Armstrong, the Court emphasized the extensive administrative 
mechanism that Congress put in place to enforce the standards of section 30(A) 
of the Medicaid Act68 in the course of rejecting a claim of an implied private 
cause of action.69 In sharp contrast, as we have seen, there was no administra-
tive mechanism whatsoever for enforcement of the Peonage Abolition Act, and 
precious little capability among any other federal entities.70 
C. Possible Defendants and Remedies 
The nexus between federal officials and private exploitation in the Territo-
ry of New Mexico that was central to Senator Sumner’s efforts as he introduced 
the bill ought to be heeded if and when plaintiffs seek to sue both federal offi-
cials and the employers those officials are aiding in exploiting undocumented 
workers.71 On the other hand, the Peonage Abolition Act nowhere suggests that 
both types of defendants are necessary; indeed, its Thirteenth Amendment ped-
igree also makes clear that no state action is necessary either.72 
Matters become more complex, of course, if a hypothetical lawsuit were to 
seek damages against federal officials as well as private employers. Even in 
                                                                                                                                
gotten out of hand to many in Congress. Compare Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Crea-
tion of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122 (2014), with Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experi-
mentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 438 (2011), and Seth P. 
Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 
1297, 1297, 1300–01 (2000). 
66  Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1381 (2015) (no implicit private 
cause of action based on the Supremacy Clause). 
67  LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: THE CURRENT QUESTIONS 92 (2017). 
68  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2012). The existence of this administrative recourse thus 
substantially bolstered Scalia’s conclusion for the majority that there was no private remedy 
intended by Congress. 
69  Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1393–94. 
70  See generally LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG 231 (1979); Handelsman 
Shugerman, supra note 65. 
71  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 240–41 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Sumner). 
72  See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976) 
(holding that civil rights protections afforded individuals by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
could be violated by private discrimination in housing and in contracts, without any showing 
of state action); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 461–62 (1968). 
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such a situation, however, there may still be several ways to sue federal gov-
ernment officials that might allow artful ways to get around or through sover-
eign immunity or to have it waived. Ideally, however, the initial salvos attempt-
ing to use the statute would seek only declaratory and injunctive relief against 
any and all defendants. 
A very brief and ancient statute—at least by American standards—sought 
to protect vulnerable laborers against many forms of exploitation. The members 
of the 39th Congress were painfully aware that the formal end of slavery had 
not and could not itself make people free. Their Peonage Abolition Act was a 
bold—albeit, at least in part, naïve—attempt to provide an important practical 
legal tool to establish freedom in the workplace. The protection was to extend 
to noncitizens as well as citizens anywhere in the United States, and it was in-
tended to afford protection to all those who encountered overwhelmingly coer-
cive employment. Those being exploited could come to federal court even if 
they were not working to pay off a debt and even if they encountered intolera-
ble employment situations they might have seemed to enter voluntarily. 
Coercion is a jagged concept whose meaning often depends on specific 
contexts,73 yet the free labor ideology of the Republican Party both before and 
after the Civil War managed to drive memories and ideas of acceptable inden-
tured servitude back into the conveniently overlooked past, though indentured 
servitude had helped settle America.74 And the violence, intimidation, and hor-
rific daily experiences former slaves encountered in the years immediately after 
Appomattox demonstrated dramatically that the free market was hardly free 
and that newly freed laborers were in desperate need of protection.75 On the last 
day of its final session, the 39th Congress sent in the troops; that same day, 
Congress also sought to provide a lasting legal mechanism to protect vulnerable 
workers from blatant coercion in the workplace.76 
While visiting Hawai’i last year, Justice Ginsburg urged lawyers and law 
students to use their knowledge and skill to work toward repairing a torn 
world.77 Within old statutory provisions, there may be found important old 
lines that are yet to be poured into new battles. 
                                                        
73  This is an ongoing problem. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in 
Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 266 (1947); Edwin W. Patterson, Compulsory Contracts 
in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 741 (1943). 
74  See generally FONER, supra note 18; ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND 
FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF 
FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 
1350-1870 (1991); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 441 (1989). 
75  See generally LITWACK, supra note 70. 
76  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1995 (1867). 
77  See Trifonovitch, supra note 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
To be sure, effective use of an 1867 statute that remains virtually a tabula 
rasa will require a great deal of strategizing and organizing, as well as a de-
manding level of skillful lawyering. But it is worth remembering that we have 
had other examples of effective use of older legal language to create more jus-
tice in our world. When Justice Ginsburg—herself a vivid exemplar of this ap-
proach—was last in Hawai’i in February 2017, she urged the lawyers and law 
students with whom she spoke to use their legal knowledge and advocacy skills 
to try to repair instances where the world is clearly torn.78 It can hardly be 
doubted that ripping and tearing asunder is going on now throughout our coun-
try. The exploitation of the undocumented human beings cries out for repara-
tive justice and the rule of law. 
                                                        
78  See id. 
